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This paper investigates if there are differences in the capital structure of European 
Multinational Firms and European Domestic Corporations, and if so, which factors can 
explain the differences. Additionally, this paper also studies whether European 
Multinational Corporations which have bigger exposure to the European market have 
different capital structures than European Multinational Corporations which are more 
exposed to the Global market (market outside Europe). The result shows, as in the U.S., 
European Multinational Corporations have lower debt rations than European Domestic 
firms. This difference can be explained by several firm-related factors: non-debt tax 
shields, profitability, age, foreign exchange risk, size and collateral value. When industry 
effects are considered, the difference in the level of leverage is not statistically significant. 
This paper proves that European Multinational Corporations have different capital 
structures considering the markets which they are exposed. European Multinational 
Corporations which have higher exposure to the European market have higher leverage 
ratios due to factors such as profitability, free cash flows available and size. The 
difference remains even if the industry effects are considered. Finally, the determinants 
of leverage are also analysed and they vary over the sample period for all firms: Domestic 
Corporations, Multinational Corporations, Multinational Corporations which are more 
exposed to the European market and Multinational Corporations which are more exposed 
to the global market.  
 
Este trabalho investiga se existem diferenças na estrutura de capital nas empresas 
Multinacionais Europeias e nas empresas Domésticas Europeias, e, se essa diferença 
existe quais são os factores que a conseguem explicar. Este trabalho visa, também, estudar 
se as empresas Multinacionais Europeias que têm uma maior exposição ao mercado 
europeu têm uma estrutura de capital igual às empresas Multinacionais com uma forte 
exposição global (fora da Europa). O resultado mostra que, tal como nos Estados Unidos, 
as empresas Multinacionais têm um nível de dívida inferior às empresas Domésticas. Este 
trabalho apresenta quais são os factores específicos que podem explicar essa diferença. 
Quando são introduzidos os efeitos das indústrias, contudo, esta diferença passa a ser 
estatisticamente não significativa. Este trabalho prova, ainda, que as Multinacionais têm 
diferentes estruturas de capitais consoante os mercados em que têm maior exposição. As 
Multinacionais Europeias com maior expoisção à Europa têm um rácio de endividamento 
maior do que as Multinacionais Europeias com maior exposição aos mercados Globais. 
Esta diferença persiste mesmo quando são introduzidos os efeitos das indústrias. 
Finalmente, os factores determinantes na estrutura de capital são também analisados e, 
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1. Introduction & Literature Review 
One of the most important topics in corporate finance is how firms finance their 
operations. Modigliani and Miller studied the capital structure of firms and they 
developed an extremely well-known theory which says if there are not imperfections in 
capital markets, such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, transaction costs, symmetry of market 
information and equivalence in borrowing costs for companies and investors, Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) concluded that the market value of a company does not depend on its 
capital structure since debt policy does not matter. Another important proposition of their 
theory is that the cost of capital is unaffected by capital structure. However, in the reality, 
there are imperfections in capital markets and thus these conclusions cannot be applied.   
Since this article published, researchers have started to undertake several studies in order 
to find out if there is an optimal capital structure. Empirical evidence shows that capital 
structure is influenced by several firm-related characteristics, which include growth 
opportunities, earning volatility, profitability, and non-debt tax shield. (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Homaifar, Zietz and 
Benkato, 1994). 
In recent years, an effort has been made to incorporate this issue into the international 
field. Many researchers studied whether there are differences between the capital 
structure of Multinational firms (MNCs) and Domestic firms (DCs), and which factors 
are important to consider when determining the debt level. Several studies have been 
conducted to evaluate the effect of internationalization on identified capital structure 
determinants (Shapiro, 1978). Other researches have been made in order to examine if 
environmental factors such as political risk and exchange rate risk have an impact on the 
financing decision of a multinational firm (Burgman, 1996). In addition, Lee and Kwok 
(1988) examined the influence of environmental factors on the firm-related capital 
structure determinants (agency costs, bankruptcy costs, tax benefits).  
Theoretically, many authors claim that multinational companies should display a higher 
debt ratio when compared to domestic corporations. This comes from the fact that 
Multinational corporations operate in several economies and as diversification should 
enhance lower earnings volatility, there would be a lower probability of bankruptcy. 
Mittoo and Zhang (2008) prove that multinational Canadian corporations have a higher 
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leverage ratio than domestic firms. Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) have also found the 
same in French multinational firms.  
However, the US evidence shows that MNCs have in fact less debt in their capital 
structures than DCs (Lee, 1986; Fatemi, 1988; Lee and Kwok, 1988; Doukas and 
Pantzalis, 2003). Additionally, Akhtar and Oliver (2009) have reached the same 
conclusion in Japanese corporations. Ahkhtar (2005) has not found any significant 
differences in leverage between Australian MNCs and DCs. 
This paper will empirically examine whether MNCs in five European countries - 
Portugal, Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom - have different capital 
structure from DCs and, if so which factors could explain that difference. This study also 
aims to test if MNCs which have a larger exposure to European markets have a different 
capital structure from MNCs that have a larger exposure to Global markets outside 
Europe. This last comparison is of particular interest since the European Union is a 
political-economical union where there is free trade of goods, services, capital, and 
people. There has been a standardization of laws in the countries which are members of 
the European Union and there is also a monetary Union. 
This paper comprises four sections. The first section briefly reviews previous literature 
on capital structure. The second section is an explanation of the methodology which has 
been used. Section three shows the empirical findings regarding this project and discusses 
the results. Finally, the last section presents a summary of the paper and explains its 
conclusions.  
 
2. Capital Structure Determinants 
In this section, I will discuss previous capital structure theories and relevant determinants 
in decisions regarding debt that past literature has found. Hypotheses will be made an 
then tested in the next section.  
2.1. Agency Theory 
The agency costs of debt in corporations arise since sometimes shareholders and 
debtholders do not have the same goals. Shareholders want to increase their wealth at the 
expense of debtholders’ wealth expropriation (Myers, 1977). The conflict can arise from 
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three areas of financial decision: investment, financing, and dividend distribution. A 
higher agency cost of debt will lead to a higher cost of debt and consequently lower 
leverage since bondholders need more resources to monitor the firm. (Mittoo and Zhang, 
2005) 
Agency costs affect the optimal debt level and these costs can be different in DCs and in 
MNCs. These include differences in monitoring costs, differing asset structures and 
international capital and labor market imperfections, which in turn include barriers such 
as restrictions on the degree of foreign ownership of firms, and direct control on the export 
and import of capital (Burgman, 1996).  
MNCs firms are likely to face higher agency costs than DCs. Burgman (1996) claims that 
MNCs face higher auditing costs, languages differences, sovereignty uncertainties, and 
varying legal and accounting systems. Besides that, he also argues that investors face 
higher informational gaps. Additionally, MNCs have greater access to the international 
capital markets, which translates into more opportunities for growth when compared to  
DCs. Myers (1977) argues that firms with higher growth opportunities are likely to face 
higher agency costs of debt. 
Moreover, the agency costs will be higher for MNCs than for DCs, and the agency costs 
will be lower for MNCs that have more exposure to the European market than for those 
with Global exposure. This predictions is based on the close economic and business 
environment in the European Union, which makes it easier for bondholders to gather 
information on MNCs with European exposure.  
 
2.2. Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order Theory 
Debt presents advantages but also disadvantages. Trade- Off theory argues that a firm 
balances bankruptcy costs against tax advantages of debt (Chen, Cheng and Kim, 1997), 
based on this adjustment each firm will find its optimal level of debt. Due to earnings 
diversification, MNCs should have lower bankruptcy costs. Therefore, according to this 
statement, MNCs should have more debt than DCs. 
Pecking order theory argues that when firms choose to finance themselves they will firstly 
use internal cash flows, then they will raise debt and finally they will issue equity. 
Following the pecking order theory, a firm which displays a low business risk has a lower 
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information asymmetry and the level of leverage should be lower. (Akhtar and Oliver, 
2009). Moreover, considering that MNCs should have lower business risk, MNCs should 
have lower debt levels than DCs. 
2.3. Determinants in capital structure 
A. Business Risk 
Business risk is the risks associated with the firm´s future operations. There are many 
factors that can affect this variable, for instance, economic context, sales volume, input 
cost, among others. Additionally, business risk can be perceived as the expected costs of 
financial distress and bankruptcy costs faced by a firm.  
From previous studies, it is possible to conclude that business risk has an impact on the 
decision of a capital structure. Many authors defend an inverse relation between business 
risk and the level of leverage. In other words, firms with higher business risk should have 
lower debt than those which have lower business risk. 
 Since debt is something that firms obligatorily have to pay, firms with higher business 
risk - which are associated with higher volatility in their earnings - may not be able to 
meet that obligation at all times. On the other hand, debtholders know that these firms 
have a higher probability to default so they will require a higher rate of return, leading to 
a very costly way of financing.  
The European Union follows a classical tax system, so firms have an incentive to issue 
debt instead of shares in order to take advantage of tax saving. Akhtar and Oliver (2009) 
argue that higher levels of business risks reduces the profitability of the interest tax shield 
which is going to be used and thus increases the risk of bankruptcy. 
According to many different authors, MNCs can benefit from the international 
diversification and thus reduce the operational risk, which contributes to raising debt 
ratios. It is often argued that the international diversification of earnings should enable 
MNCs to sustain a higher level of debt than DCs, without increasing their default risk ( 
Eiteman, Stonehill & Moffett, 1998). MNCs are expected to have lower bankruptcy costs 
when compared to DCs due to their ability to diversify across markets which are not 
perfectly correlated. (Burgman, 1996) 
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Due to their ability to internationally diversify, MNCs are expected to have lower 
volatility than DCs. With that in mind, MNCs are expected to have higher debt ratios than 
DCs. 
However, international diversification has its negative aspects since it can contribute to 
higher agency costs due to international dispersion, which leads to a higher rate of return 
demanded by bondholders. 







Where 𝝈𝒊 is the Standard Deviation of equity returns for firm i over the previous 52 
weeks, 𝑫𝒊,𝒕 is the book value of total debt at the end of the year t for firm i, 𝑬𝒊,𝒕is the 
market capitalization of equity at the end of year t for firm i and 𝒕𝒄 is the corporate tax 
rate. 
 
B. Collateral Value of Assets 
Another important factor that affects the capital structure of a firm is the type of assets 
that it has. Firms with high collateral assets have greater ability to negotiate debt than 
those with high intangible assets or without collateral assets. Tangible assets are seen as 
valuable for debtholders in case of bankruptcy. Akhtar and Oliver (2009) argue that the 
moral hazard risks are reduced when the firm offers tangible assets as collateral and this 
constitutes a positive signal to the debtholders. Furthermore, it is possible to predict that 
there is a positive relationship between leverage and collateral value of assets.  
On the other hand, Akhtar and Oliver (2009) also point out that tangible assets lower 
information asymmetries, thus making equity less costly for firms to rise and so leverage 
ratios would be lower. 
Regarding tangible assets, MNCs probably have a lower proportion of these assets due to 
political risk exposure, in order to avoid big losses in case of expropriation or nationality. 
Since there are two different ways in which collateral value can influence the capital 
structure of a firm, it is unknown whether MNCs will have more or less collateral assets 
than DCs, and if this variable will have a positive or negative impact on leverage ratios.  
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𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕 =
𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕
𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕
 
C. Free Cash Flow  
Profitable firms are generally less likely to face bankruptcy and place a higher value on 
tax deduction of interest payments than less profitable firms. This provides incentives to 
use more debt than equity. Firms with great amount of excess cash may face conflicts 
between shareholders and debtholders - agency costs. Debt can be seen as a discipline 
method for managers since it is a periodical obligation that managers are forced to meet. 
Bondholders can declare that a company is in default and lead it to bankruptcy. In 
conclusion, debt reduces the agency cost of free cash flows by reducing the cash flow 
available for spending at the discretion of managers (Stulz, 1990; Harris and Raviv, 
1991).  
Therefore, it is expected to see a positive relation between profitable firms and level of 
leverage. 
However, pecking order theory argues that a firm that can generate excess cash will use 
internal resources to finance new projects and only then will it use external sources to 
obtain the financing needed. Moreover, under pecking order theory there is a negative 
relation between free cash flows and leverage. 
MNCs have better opportunities to earn more profit when compared to DCs mainly due 
to having access to more than one source of earnings and a better chance to exploit 
favourable business conditions in particular countries ( Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Chkir 
and Cosset, 2001). 
𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔𝒊,𝒕 =
𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊,𝒕
𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕
 
Where 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝒊,𝒕 is the earnings before interest and taxes for firm i in year t and 𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊,𝒕 is 
the total tax paid for firm i in year t. 
D. Foreign Exchange Risk 
Krainer (1972) concludes that M&M principles cannot be applied in international 
situations. All firms, domestic and multinational, are exposed to the foreign exchange 
risk. This risk is associated with changes in different currency, which has implications on 
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demand, supply, price, among other factors. The more sensitive a firm’s cash flows and 
earnings are to foreign exchange rate fluctuations, the lower the expected level of debt 
(Burgman, 1996). In fact, Burgman concluded that foreign exchange rate is a relevant 
factor when it comes to determining the level of leverage of a firm.  
Traditionally, it is argued that MNCs are more exposed to exchange rate risk and the 
expected bankruptcy cost would be greater, thus MNCs should display a lower debt level. 
However, Burgman (1996) claims that MNCs with a higher economic exchange rate 
exposure should have higher debt levels. Economic exchange rate risk is difficult to 
hedge. Nonetheless, MNCs have a powerful tool to use. Burgman (1996) explains that if 
an MNC has foreign currency denominated income from its foreign affiliates, it can hedge 
the exchange risk on this income by raising foreign currency-denominated capital. Since 
it is generally easier (and cheaper) for MNCs to issue debt than equity in foreign markets, 
they may increase their foreign debt in an effort to hedge their economic exchange rate 
exposure.   
In conclusion, although MNCs may have greater exposure to foreign exchange risks, the 
risks may be hedged. Obviously, DCs also have the opportunity to hedge any foreign 
exchange risks. However, evidence of economies of scale in risk management, 
particularly the use of derivatives, may result in limited derivative use by DCs (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Nance et al., 1993; Martin and Mauer, 2004). 
Therefore, it is possible to predict that MNCs should have a greater exposure to economic 
exchange rate risk than DCs. 
This variable is extremely difficult to measure in European Union, due to the existence 
of the Monetary Union, and since this work is based on firms’ disclosures, it was selected 
a proxy: 




E. Political Risk 
Political risk is the probability of there being political events which will have a negative 
impact on the firm´s operations. This risk includes the expropriation of assets, trade 
controls, institutional ineffectiveness, threat of war, social unrest, disorderly transfers of 
power, political violence, international disputes, regime changes, and regulatory 
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restrictions (Jodice, 1985).  A firm may face political risk due to political instability in a 
country. 
 Akhtar and Oliver (2009) conclude that firms with significant foreign financing, foreign 
suppliers or customers, or other international transactions or assets, are relatively exposed 
to adverse changes in currency controls, capital flow barriers, and other laws and 
regulations that constitute political risk. Thus, MNCs will face higher political risk and it 
is expected that they have less leverage due to a greater probability of wealth loss.  MNCs 
with greater exposure to European markets ae expected to have less political risk than 
MNCs with Global exposure, since European Union members have relatively stable 
democracies in their countries.  
However, according to Burgman (1996), this type of risk is very difficult to measure and 
to hedge. One way to mitigate this risk is to use debt from the local market. Hence, it can 
be argued that MNCs that operate in riskier countries should be expected to have higher 
debt ratios. 
𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒊,𝒕 = ∑
𝑰𝒄,𝒕
∑ 𝑰𝒄,𝒕𝒊∈𝑹
∗  𝝀𝒊  
Where 𝑰𝒄,𝒕 is the revenue of a company, c, from a particular country, t and 𝝀𝒕is the value 
that country t has on an Economic Freedom Index. This economic freedom index is from 
The Heritage Foundation in partnership with Wall Street Journal. This index is used as a 
proxy for the political risk. The maximum value of political risk is 100 meaning the lowest 
level of political risk and the minimum value is 0 which represents the riskiest political 
risk ranking. 
F. Growth 
Myers (1977) argues that agency problems are particularly serious for assets which give 
the firm the option to undertake growth opportunities in the future. The underinvestment 
(debt overhang) problem (Myers, 1977) argues that with fixed claims in a firm's capital 
structure, debtholders have a senior claim over shareholders to cash flows.  Sometimes, 
undertaking positive net present value (NPV) projects could reduce share value. 
Managers, working as intermediary for shareholders, have incentives to reject positive 
NPV projects and this rejection leads to underinvestment. The existence of 
underinvestment problems implies that firms with higher growth opportunities should use 
less debt.  
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Since MNCs are perceived to have more growth opportunities, according to this, MNCs 
will have higher agency costs and thus debt ratios will be lower. 
Additionally, Kim and Lyn (1986) explain that MNCs possess monopolistic advantages 
that enable them to outperform local companies in host countries, and these advantages 
are reflected on the value of future growth options of the company. Finally, Akhtar and 
Oliver (2009) argues that firms with more growth options are expected to have higher 
information asymmetries, and according to pecking order theory these firms are expected 





Where 𝑴𝑽𝒊,𝒕 is the market value of equity for firm i in year t and 𝑩𝑽𝒊,𝒕 is the book value 
of equity for firm i in year t. 
G. Profitability 
Profitable firms are less likely to face bankruptcy than less profitable firms. Myers’ 
(1984) pecking order theory of capital structure shows that if a firm is profitable then it 
is more likely to finance projects using internal resources rather than external sources. 
Hence, more profitable firms are expected to hold less debt, since it is easier and more 
cost effective to finance internally. Under Pecking order theory, it is expected to see a 
negative relation between profitability and leverage.  
Since MNCs have access to more than one source of earnings and a better chance of 
having favourable business conditions in particular countries, they have more 
opportunities to be more profitable when compared to DCs ( Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989). 
All things considered, it is easy to predict that MNCs are probably more profitable than 
DCs, and therefore MNCs are expected to have relatively lower debt levels than DCs. 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕
= 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒏𝒆𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝟒 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝒊 
H. Non-Debt Tax Shields 
Taxation and its relation to capital structure varies according to the tax regime. Under the 
European Union classical tax system, the tax deductibility of interest is expected to induce 
a preference for debt. 
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These non-debt tax shields compete with interest as a tax deduction. Firms with higher 
non - debt tax shields are expected to have lower leverage, as the tax benefits of leverage 
are relatively less valuable.  
MNCs should be better prepared than DCs to exploit taxation regulations across different 
countries than DCs for the purpose of reducing their tax liabilities (Homaifar et al., 1998). 
Thus, MNCs should have higher levels of non-debt tax shields, leading to lower levels of 
leverage when compared to DCs.  
𝑵𝒐𝒏 − 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏 − (
𝑻𝑨𝑿𝒊,𝒕
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕
) 
I. Size 
Firm size is a positive determinant of capital structure (Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Chkir and Cosset, 2001). Size should have a positive relation 
to leverage since larger firms are more diversified and thus less likely to default.  
However, Akhtar and Oliver (2009) argues that larger firms are expected to have lower 
information asymmetries, thus making equity issues more attractive. This implies a 
negative relation between size and leverage.  
In conclusion, MNCs are expected to be larger than DCs and therefore they should 
therefore have higher leverage ratios. 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑳𝑵(𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕) 
J. Age 
Age is also relevant to capital structure choice. Older firms are expected to face lower 
debt-related agency costs (Frank and Goyal, 2009).  Lower debt-related agency costs 
result in a greater access to debt, and consequently a higher leverage ratio for older firms.  
In addition, older firms generally also face lower default risks due to more stable earnings, 
which also implies a higher leverage ratio for older firms.  
Akhtar and Oliver (2009) explain that age may be a proxy for lower information 
asymmetries. Equity is very sensitive to information asymmetry, thus according to this 
with less information asymmetry older firms are expected to have less leverage since 
equity is cheaper. 
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 Since there are conflicting theories regarding this factor, it is not clear whether age has a 
positive or negative impact on leverage. However, MNCs are expected to be older than 
DCs since firms are generally likely to begin as DCs and expand over time to become 
multinationals. (Akhtar and Oliver, 2009). 
𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑳𝑵( 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝒊, 𝒊𝒏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
3. Methodology 
For this project, 368 different companies, which are publicly traded in Portugal, Spain, 
France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany, were selected. Companies in these 
countries were chosen since they are members of European Union and the UK, Germany 
and France play a major role in the European Union markets and Portugal and Spain make 
it possible to analyse less liquid markets. Some firms were excluded from the sample, all 
the banking and financial services industry due to the fact this industry has some 
specifications and other requirements, and also they were eliminated some firms that have 
less than 3 years of observations. Finally, others firms were excluded from the sample 
because they have negative values regarding growth variable.  
 Data were extracted from 1997 to 2014 so that the factors could be analysed from 2001 
onwards, after the dot.com bubble. This timeframe was divided into two different 
samples, one from 2001 to 2007 and another from 2008 to 2014. In 2007, when Lehman 
Brothers collapsed, a major world financial crisis started. This division was made to 
understand if there are differences in the determinants which affect the leverage ratio 
before and after the crisis.  
After extracting the data from Thomson Reuters, it was important to identify which 
companies in this group were Multinational companies and which ones were Domestic 
companies. Multinational companies were defined as the firms which have more than 
30% of foreign sales and more than 10% of foreign assets. This last factor is important in 
order to avoid considering a firm to be Multinational only when it has a high percentage 
of exportation.  After all things considered, the sub-sample of Multinational firms has 300 
firms and the sub-sample of Domestic firms has 67 firms. 
The Multinational sample was divided into firms which are considered to have a global 
exposure and those which have Europe exposure. According to the IAS 14, it was 
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established that firms with more than 25% of total sales outside Europe have Global 
exposure. Firms which do not fulfil this criterion have European exposure.  
The purposes of this work is to investigate if there are differences in capital structure of 
MNCs and DCs and between MNCs which have Global exposure and MNCs with 
European exposure. The most important factor to clarify is leverage. In the liabilities side 
of a firm’s balance sheet it is possible to find short-term debt and medium to long-term 
debt. For this paper, leverage of the firm is defined as:  
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 =
𝑳𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕
𝑳𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑬𝒊,𝒕
 
Where 𝑳𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕is the long-term debt of the firm i, in the year t and 𝑬𝒊,𝒕 is the market 
capitalization of equity of firm i, in the end of year t.  
As discussed in the previous section, there are factors that might have an impact on the 
capital structure of a firm: Business risk (BR), Collateral Value of assets (CV), Free cash 
flows (FCF), Foreign exchange risk (FR), political risk (PR), Growth opportunities 
(Growth), Profitability (Prof), Non-debt tax shields (NDTS), Size and Age. These factors 
are all used in several regressions to exanimate their significance when determining debt 
ratio. Besides these firm-related factors, a Time (Time) variable was also included to 
verify if a time trend is also significant. A dummy variable in order to accommodate the 
countries’ effects was included too (Country).  
To study the capital structure of firms, several models were constructed:  
Model 1: 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 = 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟑 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟒𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +  𝜷𝟓𝑨𝒈𝒆 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟕𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 +  𝜷𝟖 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 + ∑ 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚
𝟏
𝟒 + 𝜶  
 
Model 2:  𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 = 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟑 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟒𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +  𝜷𝟓𝑨𝒈𝒆 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟕𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 +  𝜷𝟖 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑴𝑵𝑪 + ∑ 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚
𝟏




Model 3: 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 = 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟑 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟒𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +  𝜷𝟓𝑨𝒈𝒆 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟕𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 +  𝜷𝟖 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑴𝑵𝑪 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗
𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 +  𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟓𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑨𝒈𝒆 +  𝜷𝟏𝟔𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +  𝜷𝟏𝟕𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟖𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 +  𝜷𝟏𝟗𝑴𝑵𝑪 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 + ∑ 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚
𝟏
𝟒 +  𝜶 
 
Model 4: 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 = 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟑 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟒𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +  𝜷𝟓𝑨𝒈𝒆 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟕𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 +  𝜷𝟖 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 + ∑ 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚
𝟏
𝟒 +  𝜶 
 
Model 5: 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 = 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟑 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟒𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +  𝜷𝟓𝑨𝒈𝒆 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟕𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 +  𝜷𝟖 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗ 𝑭𝑪𝑭 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗ 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 +
 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 +  𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗ 𝑩𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +  𝜷𝟏𝟓𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗
𝑨𝒈𝒆 +  𝜷𝟏𝟔𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗ 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 + 𝜷𝟏𝟕𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗ 𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑺𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 +  𝜷𝟏𝟖𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 +  𝜷𝟏𝟗𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 + ∑ 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚
𝟏
𝟒 +  𝜶 
 
Model 1 was used for the entire sample and for each sub sample (MNC, Domestic, Global 
exposure and European exposure) in order to find the most important factors that have an 
impact on the decision of leverage in a firm. Model 2 was used to investigate whether 
capital structure is different in multinational firms and domestic firms. In order to do so 
a dummy variable was introduced. After concluding that there is a difference in the capital 
structure among firms, Model 3 is used in order to identify the factors that can explain 
the difference between domestic firms and multinational firms.  
Model 4 and Model 5 are only used in the sub-sample of multinational firms. In Model 4 
a dummy variable was incorporated, Global, which is ‘one’ if the firm has more exposure 
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to Global markets outside Europe and ‘zero’ if the MNC has more than 75% of its assets 
in Europe. This dummy is used to see the effects of a global exposure. Model 5 is a 
regression to find the factors which explain the difference between capital structure of 
multinational firms with a high global exposure or multinational firms with highly 
European exposure. 
4. Results 
This study was conducted with 367 European companies that are listed in several 
countries. In this sample there are 67 companies that are qualified as domestic firms and 
300 that can be seen as Multinational corporations.   
Table 1 – Panel A and Panel B provides the information regarding statistics which 
descriptive the firm-related variables that are used in the Models throughout this project. 
In Panel A, firstly, on average DCs have more leverage than MNCs. This result is 
consistent with previous results from US and Japanese evidence. This is extremely 
interesting since it might allow us to assume that there are differences in the capital 
structure of Multinational corporations and domestics in Europe, and in addition, DCs 
have more leverage than MNCs. As it was expected, on average, MNCs are bigger than 
DCs and they are also older. Another conclusion, which is possible to make by analysing 
table 1 is that on average, MNCs are more profitable firms and free cash flows seems to 
be higher for MNCs. However, DCs face higher growth opportunities.  Regarding foreign 
exchange risk, MNCs display a higher value on average than European DCs, despite the 
fact that political risk is higher for DCs. Business risk, on average, has the same value for 
all types of firms. Non-debt tax shield also has similar values for European DCs and 
MNCs. Collateral value of assets seems to be higher for DCs than MNCs.  
In Panel B, it is possible to compare MNCs with Europe exposure and MNCs with Global 
exposure. On average, MNCs with European exposure have more leverage than MNCs 
with Global exposure. From this value, it is possible to assume that there is a difference 
between capital structures in MNCs depending on the market they have are more exposed. 
On average, MNCs with Europe exposure are more profitable, they also have more assets 
to use as collateral and they display lower foreign exchange risk. However, MNCs with 
Global exposure, on average, have higher free cash flows and growth opportunities. 
Since there are many different factors that were tested in the OLS regression of each 
model, it is important to investigate if there are multicollinearity problems. Table 2 
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presents the correlation matrix between independent variables but also with leverage. All 
correlations are below 50% therefore there are not problems with multicollinearity in any 
models.  
Table 3 provides results for the regression of Model 1 for ‘All sample’ and for MNCs and 
DCs separately. Wald Test, which is also present in table 3, shows that at least one 
coefficient of the model is different from zero for all groups analysed and R2 shows that 
the model can explain a good portion of leverage. Considering the ‘All sample’ of 367 
companies and during the all sample period, it is possible to understand that size, business 
risk, non-debt tax shield, growth, profitability and the passage of time is highly significant 
in determining the of leverage of the firm. Collateral value is also significant, at 5% level.  
Table 3 indicates that business risk is significant at 1% and negative for the all companies 
analyzed, MNCs and DCs, and for the MNCs sub-sample. However, business risk is not 
significant for DCs. This result suggests that MNCs with higher business risks will have 
less debt. Companies with higher business risk, usually associated with higher volatility 
of earnings, face a higher probability of bankruptcy, which leads to a higher cost of debt 
and, as a consequence, less leverage in the capital structure. This result is consistent with 
Agency Costs Theory. 
Collateral value of assets is significant for all companies, at 5% for MNC at 1% level and 
finally for DCs at 10% level. However, MNCs display a positive sign in this variable. In 
other words, MNCs that have more tangible assets will have more debt, since there are 
less bankruptcy costs. This result is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995). However, 
European DCs display a negative coefficient, which means that firms with more tangible 
assets will have less leverage ratios. As said in previous sections, firms with more tangible 
assets have lower asymmetry of information and equity will probably be cheaper to raise 
than debt. This could be one possible explanation for this negative coefficient for DCs in 
collateral value.  
From table 3, it is possible to see that free cash flow is not significant for either DCs or 
MNCs. This result suggests that this variable is not able to explain capital structure of a 
firm in Europe, despite of previous empirical evidence found in other countries. However, 
Akhtar and Oliver (2009) showed that for Japanese companies this variable is also not 
significant to explain the capital structure. 
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Foreign exchange risk is not significant for all the groups of firms considered. For DCs it 
is not significant. This result is not surprising since domestic firms have lower exposure 
to other economies, so exchange risk is not one of the biggest concerns these firms face. 
However, MNCs display a positive relation to foreign exchange risk, at 1% level, because, 
as previously said, MNCs can hedge this risk by exploiting international capital markets. 
Additionally, debt is usually cheaper than equity. Moreover, leverage ratios will be higher 
in order to hedge the foreign exchange risk.  
Political risk is not a significant variable for leverage in either group that was tested. It is 
not surprising that this variable is not significant. For MNCs, Lee and Kwok (1988) argue 
that MNCs may hedge political risks by borrowing from the local market, and expected 
losses may be offset by an expected reduction in local debt liability.  
Table 3 also provides the results for the growth variable. It is significant for MNCs, DCs 
and even when the ‘all sample’ is considered, at 1%.  As expected, this variable has 
negative sign for all samples: European firms with higher growth opportunities will have 
less leverage ratios. This is consistent with previous literature. For instance, Akhtar and 
Oliver (2009) have reached the same conclusion regarding Japanese MNCs. This result 
is also consistent with agency theory since if a firm has more opportunities to growth it 
is harder to measure the firm value and bankruptcy costs for debt holders.  
Another variable is profitability, which is not significant for DCs but it is a highly 
important factor regarding leverage ratio for MNCs. For these corporations it is negative 
and significant at 1%. This result for profitability supports the pecking order theory of 
Myers (1977), which predicts that a leverage will be negatively related to the profitability. 
A profitable firm will choose in the first place internal cash to finance new projects.  
Non-Debt Tax Shields are significant at 1% for the ‘all sample’. However they are 
irrelevant for DCs. Akhtar (2005), also found that for Australian DCs, Non-Debt Tax 
Shields are irrelevant. For MNCs corporations they are also significant, at 1%, and they 
reveal a positive coefficient. Contrary to what was expected, higher non-debt tax shield 
also contributes to higher leverage ratios. 
Size is highly significant for all groups analysed, at 1%. This variable has a positive 
relationship with leverage ratios, supporting the Trade-Off theory, since larger firms in 
size should have lower bankruptcy costs.  On the other hand, Age is irrelevant for all 
groups analysed. The variable that analyses the time trend is significant for MNCs and 
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for the sample that takes into account all the companies (MNCs and DCs), at 1%, and it 
is negative. During this period, 2001-2014, companies have been trying to deleverage.  
 After this analysis, although past literature argues that all of these factors have an impact 
on the capital structure of a firm, Table 3 proves that for European companies (MNCs 
and DCs together) some factors are not relevant when determining of capital structure. 
Only size, business risk, collateral value of assets, non-debt tax shield, profitability, 
growth, and time are significant. However, for MNCs the factors that can influence the 
leverage ratio of a firm are different: profitability, foreign exchange risk, size, business 
risk, collateral value of assets, non-debt tax shields, growth, and time. For DCs only 
growth, size, and collateral value of assets are important to decide the value of leverage. 
In order to recognize the differences between the decision of leverage before the latest 
financial crisis and after the financial crisis the sample was divided into two periods, one 
focusing on 2001 until 2007 and the other focusing on 2008-2014.  
Considering the all sample of companies, before 2008 size, business risk, collateral value, 
non-debt tax shields, growth, and the passage of time was relevant to determine the 
leverage of the firm. After 2008, the same factors were important; however profitability, 
at 1% level and with negative coefficient, also started to be important to take into 
consideration regarding their capital decisions. After the crisis it became harder and 
costlier to finance externally, therefore profitable firms started using their internal cash to 
finance new projects. Also foreign exchange risk becomes significant, at 10% level, with 
a negative coefficient. European firms, after the financial crisis with higher exposure to 
other markets will have less debt in their balance sheet.  
Only taking into consideration the European DCs, before the world financial crisis, the 
most relevant factors in the determination of leverage were, at 1% level of significance, 
size, growth and profitability. Larger domestic firms have more debt than smaller firms, 
firms with potential growth have less leverage, and finally companies that are more 
profitable have less debt. After 2008, the capital structure of firms suffered some changes 
and there are now different factors influencing the decision regarding leverage ratios. 
Size, business risk, time, and growth are significant at 1% level. As time goes by, firms 
are deleveraging; when business risk increases, debt decreases, and firms with higher 
growth opportunities have less debt. Considering that business risk only became 
significant after the financial crisis, it is interesting that debtholders are now more 
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skeptical about investments. Profitability, which is significant at 5%, has a negative 
coefficient, which explains how domestic firms with higher profitability are trying to 
deleverage and finance their new projects with internal resources, probably due to the 
increase in cost of debt and equity.  
The same approach was made for MNCs. Before 2008, free cash flows are significant at 
10% with negative sign, however after the crisis they become irrelevant.  On the other 
hand, profitability is not significant at any level before the financial crisis, so it has no 
impact on the debt level of the firm. However, after 2008 profitability is an important 
factor in the decision- making of leverage. It is significant at 5% and negative. It is 
consistent with the pecking order theory, as previously said. Additionally, foreign 
exchange risk became not significant after the world financial crisis in 2007. Growth, 
size, business risk, collateral value, non-debt tax shield, time are also important and 







 All European Firms  MNCs  DCs 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Leverage 0.24 0.22 0.00 1.00 Leverage 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.95 Leverage 0.26 0.26 0.00 1.00 
FCF 0.16 0.80 -2.28 30.88 FCF 0.16 0.86 -1.09 30.88 FCF 0.15 0.37 -2.28 6.06 
Growth 2.50 3.00 0.00 99.72 Growth 2.38 2.66 0.00 99.72 Growth 3.05 4.22 0.00 36.42 
Prof 0.11 0.76 -3.57 26.55 Prof 0.12 0.82 -2.00 26.55 Prof 0.07 0.38 -3.57 1.97 
Age 3.27 1.01 0.00 5.85 Age 3.30 1.01 0.00 5.85 Age 3.16 0.98 0.00 4.80 
FR 0.56 0.29 0.00 1.00 FR 0.65 0.24 0.00 1.00 FR 0.17 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Size 21.37 2.10 16.79 27.46 Size 21.54 2.15 16.79 27.46 Size 20.52 1.60 17.14 24.86 
PR 64.81 10.94 2.72 98.98 PR 63.84 10.97 2.72 98.98 PR 69.43 9.52 23.72 89.51 
BR 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.47 BR 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.47 BR 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.44 
CV 0.25 0.20 -0.61 0.95 CV 0.24 0.19 -0.61 0.95 CV 0.27 0.24 0.00 0.94 
NDTS 0.98 0.06 0.28 2.34 NDTS 0.98 0.05 0.37 2.34 NDTS 0.98 0.08 0.28 2.34 
Table 1Panel A - Descriptive Statics.   This table reports the descriptive Statics of all the independent variables that are going to be used in the models stated in the previous section. In this table there 
are three different groups with their descriptive statics: All European Firms that represent all the companies considered in the five countries selected, 367 corporations, MNCs corresponds to all firms 
that are considered to be Multinational Firms, firms which have more than 10% of foreign assets and 30% of foreign sales, in total there are 300 MNCs, finally DCs is domestic corporations and it has 
67 companies. Leverage is long term debt divided by the sum of long term debt with market capitalization of equity, FCF is free cash flows, which is calculated as the ratio of  the sum of EBIT, 
depreciations and amortizations less paid taxes and book value of total assets; Growth variable  is  measured as the book-to-market ratio, Prof is Profitability of a firm is computed as an average of   net 
income to total sales in the last four years; Age is the logarithm  of number of years since the date of incorporation; FR stands for Foreign Exchange Risk  which is  the ratio of total foreign sales and 
total sales; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Pr is Political Risk which is calculated as the multiplication of the country’s score in the economic freedom and the weight of sales in the country in total 
sales   and then compute the same for all countries and sum; BR is considered to be Business Risk  that is the standard deviation of the previous 52 weeks scaled  by  one plus the ratio of total debt  deducted 
by taxes and Market capitalization.; finally NDTS is Non-debt Tax  Shields and it is computed as one minus  taxes paid scaled by total book value of assets.  In this table there are information regarding 






 MNCs  Europe Exposure  Global Exposure 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Leverage 0.24 0.21 0.00 0.95 Leverage 0.27 0.22 0.00 0.95 Leverage 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.95 
FCF 0.16 0.86 -1.09 30.88 FCF 0.11 0.07 -0.06 0.48 FCF 0.18 1.03 -1.09 30.88 
Growth 2.38 2.66 0.00 99.72 Growth 2.30 3.55 0.00 99.72 Growth 2.42 2.19 0.00 25.31 
Prof 0.12 0.82 -2.00 26.55 Prof 0.22 1.48 -1.08 26.55 Prof 0.08 0.21 -2.00 1.74 
Age 3.30 1.01 0.00 5.85 Age 3.22 1.06 0.00 5.40 Age 3.33 0.99 0.00 5.85 
FR 0.65 0.24 0.00 1.00 FR 0.56 0.22 0.00 1.00 FR 0.68 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Size 21.54 2.15 16.79 27.46 Size 21.34 2.20 16.79 26.70 Size 21.63 2.12 16.83 27.46 
PR 63.84 10.97 2.72 98.98 PR 65.34 9.28 13.34 98.98 PR 63.22 11.54 2.72 98.86 
BR 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.47 BR 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.32 BR 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.47 
CV 0.24 0.19 -0.61 0.95 CV 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.91 CV 0.23 0.18 -0.61 0.95 
NDTS 0.98 0.05 0.37 2.34 NDTS 0.98 0.07 0.37 2.34 NDTS 0.98 0.04 0.41 1.72 
Table 1 Panel B - Descriptive Statics.   This table reports the descriptive Statics of all the independent variables that are going to be used in the models stated in the previous section. In this table there 
are three different groups with their descriptive statics: MNCs corresponds to all firms that are considered to be Multinational Firms, firms which have more than 10% of foreign assets and 30% of 
foreign sales, in total there are 300 MNCs, Europe Exposure are all Multinational Corporations which have bigger exposure to the European Market, more than 75% of total sales inside Europe, in total 
there are 90 companies, finally, Global exposure comprehends all the Multinational Corporations that have bigger exposure to other markets without Europe, less than 25% of total sales are in Europe, 
in total there are 210 companies in this group. Leverage is long term debt divided by the sum of long term debt with market capitalization of equity, FCF is free cash flows, which is calculated as the 
ratio of  the sum of EBIT, depreciations and amortizations less paid taxes and book value of total assets; Growth variable  is  measured as the book-to-market ratio, Prof is Profitability of a firm is 
computed as an average of   net income to total sales in the last four years; Age is the logarithm  of number of years since the date of incorporation; FR stands for Foreign Exchange Risk  which is  the 
ratio of total foreign sales and total sales; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Pr is Political Risk which is calculated as the multiplication of the country’s score in the economic freedom and the weight 
of sales in the country in total sales   and then compute the same for all countries and sum; BR is considered to be Business Risk  that is the standard deviation of the previous 52 weeks scaled  by  one 
plus the ratio of total debt  deducted by taxes and Market capitalization.; finally NDTS is Non-debt Tax  Shields and it is computed as one minus  taxes paid scaled by total book value of assets.  In this 





  FCF Growth Prof Age FR Size PR BR CV NDTS 
FCF 100%          
Growth 10% 100%         
Prof 1% 2% 100%        
Age 6% -2% -3% 100%       
FR 3% -10% -6% 11% 100%      
Size -3% -17% 2% 0% 17% 100%     
PR 2% 6% -1% -6% -30% -11% 100%    
BR 0% 7% -3% -5% -2% -27% -1% 100%   
CV 3% -6% 4% 3% -6% -1% 8% -5% 100%  
NDTS -2% -8% -4% 2% -7% -3% 3% -2% -7% 100% 
Table 2: Correlations – This table presents the correlations between independent variables that can be important determinant factors in the decision of leverage ratio. The 
numbers above are expressed as percentage.  FCF stands for Free Cash Flows, Growth for growth opportunities, Prof for Profitability, Age for the age of the firm, FR for the 










    
 All European Firms DCs MNCs 
  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.21 0.00*** -0.14 0.27 -0.20 0.00*** 
CV 0.05 0.02** -0.11 0.06* 0.08 0.00*** 
FCF 0.00 0.46 0.01 0.51 -0.01 0.17 
FR 0.01 0.75 -0.07 0.10 0.07 0.00*** 
PR 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.86 
Growth -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.00*** -0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.00*** 
NDTS 0.19 0.00*** 0.06 0.30 0.28 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.09 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
Age 0.00 0.69 -0.02 0.34 0.00 0.48 
Time 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.28 -0.01 0.00*** 
cons -0.93 0.00*** -1.45 0.00*** -0.96 0.00*** 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
R2Overall  29%  31%  30% 
Wald Test 567.11 0.00*** 137.77 0.00*** 548.54 0.00*** 
Table 3: Output of Model 1- This table reports the results of Model 1 regression. This Model 1 is regressed for the all sample of  367 European companies and also for MNCs sub-sample and 
DCs sub-sample. This model is made with observations from 2001 to 2014. Table 3 shows the coefficients of each factors and the P value of them.  ***, **, * represent the ones that are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. This table shows the overall r-square, which measures how well the model can explain the dependent variable, in this case Leverage.  A Wald Test is also 




 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
BR -0.21 0.00*** -0.25 0.04** 
CV 0.05 0.02** -0.10 0.04** 
FCF 0.00 0.49 0.01 0.38 
FR 0.02 0.20 -0.06 0.14 
PR 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.86 
Growth -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.00*** -0.04 0.02** 
NDTS 0.19 0.00*** 0.07 0.21 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.09 0.00*** 
Age 0.00 0.74 0.02 0.15 
Time 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
_cons -0.91 0.00*** -1.68 0.00*** 
MNC -0.06 0.00*** 0.75 0.00*** 
BRMNC   0.08 0.56 
CVMNC   0.20 0.00*** 
FCFMNC   -0.02 0.21 
FRMNC   0.12 0.01*** 
PRMNC   0.00 0.82 
GrowthMNC   0.00 0.39 
ProfMNC   0.03 0.08* 
NDTSMNC   0.21 0.00*** 
SizeMNC   -0.05 0.00*** 
AgeMNC   -0.03 0.05* 
Country Dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
   
     
R2Overall  29%  29% 
Wald Test 575.70 0.00*** 662.97 0.00*** 
Table 4 – Model 2 and Model 3:  This table shows the results obtained from Model 2 and Model 3.  Besides previous 
factors that were already used in Model 1, in Model 2 and 3 other variables were introduced: a dummy variable, MNC, 
to understand if there are any differences between MNCs and DCs companies in Europe and interactions with all the 
factors   to investigate which factors can explain the difference between DCs and MNCs in Europe. This Model uses 
observations from 2001 until 2014.  In this table are present the coefficients and also p values. ***, **, * are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10%. This table shows the overall r-square, which measures how well the model can explain the 
dependent variable, in this case Leverage.  A Wald Test is also presented in this table, this test is similar to the F test, 
which measure the global significance of coefficients. Countries dummies are omitted in this table since they are only 
used to control country’s factors.
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Table 5 – Model 4 and Model 5 -This table have the results obtained after regressing Model 4 and Model 5.In these 
Models there are incorporated a dummy variable, to investigate if there are differences between capital structure in 
MNCs with different exposures and several dummy interactions in order to investigate which factors can explain the 
difference between MNCs with Global exposure and MNCs which have a greater exposure to the European market. 
Observations used in these Models are from 2001 until 2014. In this table are present the coefficients and also p values. 
***, **, * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. This table shows the overall r-square, which measures how well the 
model can explain the dependent variable, in this case Leverage.  A Wald Test is also presented in this table, this test 
is similar to the F test, which measure the global significance of coefficients. Countries dummies are omitted in this 









 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
BR -0.19 0.00*** -0.19 0.01*** 
CV 0.08 0.00*** 0.09 0.00*** 
FCF -0.01 0.19 -0.43 0.00*** 
FR 0.07 0.00*** 0.07 0.00*** 
PR 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.92 
Growth -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.02** 
NDTS 0.28 0.00*** 0.28 0.00*** 
Size 0.04 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
Age 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.79 
Time -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
cons -0.93 0.00*** -0.87 0.00*** 
Global -0.05 0.01** -0.09 0.00*** 
BRGlobal   0.00 0.81 
CVGlobal   0.00 0.73 
FCFGlobal   0.45 0.00*** 
FRGlobal   1.73 0.24 
PRGlobal   0.00 0.63 
GrowthGlobal   0.00 0.38 
ProfGlobal   -1.73 0.06* 
NDTSGlobal   0.00 0.82 
SizeGlobal   -0.08 0.11 
AgeGlobal   0.54 0.11 
Country Dummy 
Yes  Yes    
     
R2Overall  30%  31% 




Model 2 was regressed and the results obtained are in table 4. By analyzing it, it is possible 
to conclude that there are a differences between MNCs and DCs regarding the capital 
structure. This dummy variable, MNC which is ‘one’ if the firm is considered to be 
multinational and it is ‘zero’ if the firm is considered to be domestic, is significant at 1% 
level and it has a negative sign. In conclusion, in Europe there is a difference in leverage 
ratios of DCs and MNCs. Additionally, MNCs have less debt than DCs. This is consistent 
with the US evidence, however there are past literature support which do not reach the 
same result: French and Canadian evidence. Then, it is important to understand what are 
the main factors that can influence the difference between these two types of firms. This 
result was tested for other periods, before and after the financial crisis. There are 
differences in the capital structure of Multinationals and Domestics Corporations, after 
2008 the result is significant at 10% level and after this period is significant at 5%. The 
coefficients are all negative revealing that MNCs, in Europe, have less debt ratios than 
DCs. 
Table 4 also shows the results obtained from Model 3. This Model was designed in order 
to understand if MNCs have a different capital structure to those of DCs, and which 
factors can explain the difference. There are many factors that can explain the difference 
in MNCs and DCs: non-debt tax shield, foreign exchange risk, size, and collateral value 
of assets are significant at 1%, age is also relevant when it comes to explaining the 
difference in capital structure in European firms, at 5%. Finally profitability, at 10%, is 
also a relevant factor. Non-debt tax shield has a positive coefficient, so it contributes to 
MNCs having a greater impact of non-debt tax shield than DCs. This is understandable 
since this factor is significant for MNCs whereas it is not relevant for DCs when deciding 
the leverage ratio. Age has a negative coefficient in the interaction with the dummy, so 
MNCs will have less impact as age increases when compared to DCs. Foreign exchange 
risk is another relevant factor that can explain differences in capital structure in the 
European Market. MNCs have a less negative impact on foreign exchange risk in 
comparison to DCs. Size has negative coefficient so an increase in size will conduct to a 
less pronounced increase in leverage in MNCs than in DCs. For MNCs, an increase in 
collateral value will have a positive impact on leverage but a negative influence for DCs. 
Profitability has negative sign, so profitable DCs firms will raise more debt than profitable 
MNCs firms. The interaction of growth, free cash flow, political risk and business risk do 
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not provide any significant relationship that can explain the difference in capital structure 
of DCs and MNCs.  
As showed earlier in this work, there is always differences in the capital structure of 
MNCs and DCs, however the explaining factors of these differences are different through 
time. Before the financial crisis the main explaining factors were: profitability and size, 
at 1%, and non-debt tax shield and collateral value at 10%. After 2008, collateral value 
and size remain as an important factor to comprehend the difference in capital structure. 
Additionally, business risk, growth and free cash flows can be considered as explaining 
factors.  
After finding that MNCs’ capital structure is different from DCs, this paper focuses only 
on MNCs. All this work is concentrated in European companies, and since there is not a 
great amount of literature regarding this subject, it is interesting to investigate if the 
capital structure for MNCs that have a greater exposure to European market is the same 
as MNCs that have a little exposure to European Markets and prefer to develop their 
activities outside Europe (MNCs with Global exposure).  
Model 4 includes only one more variable: a dummy variable that is ‘one’ for MNCs which 
have more than 25% of foreign assets outside Europe and ‘zero’ if otherwise.  As it is 
possible to see from table 5, this dummy variable is significant at 1% and it has a negative 
sign: a firm operating in Europe will have more debt than those which operate outside 
Europe. Considering the period from 2001 until 2008, this dummy variable is still 
significant at 5% and after the crisis is significant at 10%. 
Lastly, it is important to understand which factors can have an impact on the latest 
conclusion which says that MNCs with exposure to Europe will have more debt than the 
ones with global exposure.  
 In table 5, it is possible to observe the results from the latest model tested in this project, 
Model 5. The last regression found the factors that can explain the existent difference in 
capital structure of multinational firms with Global exposure and multinational firms with 
Europe exposure. The main factors found are free cash flow to the firm, which is 
significant at 1% and profitability, 10%.  Profitability has a negative sign and MNCs with 
Global exposure have a greater negative impact on leverage ratios as the profitability rises 
than MNCs with European exposure. Free Cash Flows has a positive coefficient so for 
Global companies, so it will offset the negative impact of the free cash flows on leverage.  
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In order to test this result, the period was divided into two groups. Before the financial 
crisis, besides the previous factors, age, foreign exchange risk, political risk and collateral 
value of assets could explain the differences between MNCs. After the financial crisis, 
free cash flows remains an important variable, additionally growth and business risk help 
to understand why MNCs with greater exposure to Europe have more leverage then 
MNCs with Global exposure.  
Model 1 was also tested in these new groups of firms, MNCs which are more exposure 
to Global markets and MNCs that are more exposure to European markets, as it is possible 
to see in table 6. This model was also conducted for the ‘all sample’ period and also 
divided into two periods: before and after the crisis. There are not big differences in these 
groups of firms. From 2001 until 2014, growth, foreign exchange risk, non-debt tax 
shields, size and time are significant for both groups of firms. However, for MNCs with 
that are more exposure to European market free cash flows are also important to 
determine the leverage ratio, at 1% level, and it has a negative coefficient. This is 
consistent with pecking order theory. For MNCs that decided to expand outside Europe, 
free cash flows is an irrelevant factor explaining leverage ratios. Moreover, profitability, 
business risk and collateral value of Assets are important to understand debt ratios. Since 
these firms are dispersed all over the world it is understandable that debtholders will 
require more assets as collateral than firms which have more exposure to European 
markets which are stable democracies. Additionally, business risk is a major concern for 
firms that invest in other operations outside Europe since it is hard for debtholders to 
measure the firm value and the probability of default since they probably do not know 
very well these other markets. Profitability has negative coefficient and it is also 
consistent with pecking order theory. Business risk has also negative sign as it is predicted 
by the Agency costs Theory and collateral value is positive also as predicted.  
In both periods, for European exposure free cash flows, growth, size and time can explain 
the leverage ratio. Before the crisis, also profitability, foreign exchange risk and collateral 
value of assets could explain the debt ratio of these firms. After 2008, business risk, at 
1%, begin to have relevance in the leverage ratios. 
Concerning Global MNCs, independently of the time period considered growth, 
profitability, size, business risk, non-debt tax shield and time influence leverage ratios. 





Table 6 – Output of Model 1: This table shows the results of Model 1 applied to MNCs with greater exposure to Europe and 
MNCs with greater exposure to Global markets. The factors used are the same as in the previous study for Domestic and 
Multinational firms. The observations used are from 2001 to 2014. It shows coefficients and p-values. ***, **, *, 1%, 5% and 
10%. This table shows the overall r-square, which measures how well the model can explain the dependent variable, in this 
case Leverage.  A Wald Test is also presented in this table, this test is similar to the F test, which measure the global significance 








 European Exposure Global Exposure 
 Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
FCF -0.49 0.00*** 0.00 0.56 
Growth 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
Prof 0.00 0.41 -0.11 0.00*** 
Age 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.60 
FR 0.11 0.00*** 0.06 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
PR 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.88 
BR -0.08 0.64 -0.19 0.01*** 
CV 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.01*** 
NDTS 0.13 0.02** 0.38 0.00*** 
Time -0.00 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
cons -0.74 0.00*** -1.01 0.00*** 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  
     
R2 Overall  28%  33% 
Wald Test 157.98 0.00*** 552.99 0.00** 
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value is one of the most important factors, at 1% level, this happens because after 2008 
debtholders probably want to have a guarantee of their investment in case of bankruptcy.  
4.1. Industry Dummy 
In order to improve the results previously analysed, in all models, several dummy 
variables were incorporated in the Models, representing the industries of each firm. These 
dummy variables accommodate the differences between industries. The industries were 
extracted from Thomson and Reuters. 
Comparing with the results obtained before, most of the conclusions are the same. For the 
‘all sample’ and MNCs, the factors that can influence leverage ratios remain the same. 
However, for DCs, size, collateral value of assets and growth are still significant, but 
foreign exchange risk became significant, at 5%. DCs with greater exposure to other 
markets have less debt.  
Additionally, adding industry dummy variables, the difference between MNCs and DCs, 
measured in Model 2, become not significant at any level and for any period considered: 
from 2001 until 2014, from 2001 until 2007 and from 2008 until 2014. This result 
suggests that there are no differences between MNCs and DCs concerning debt levels. 
This result is consistent with Akhtar (2005), which found that the level of leverage of 
Australian MNCs and Australian DCs does not differ significantly. 
Considering, the MNCs sub-sample it was also tested if there are differences in MNCs 
that have greater exposure to European markets and MNCs with greater exposure to 
Global markets. This difference sustains when introduction industry dummies and it is 
significant at 5%. The explaining factors for this difference are the same as before: 
profitability and free cash flows.  
MNCs with greater exposure to Europe, with this industry dummies incorporated, have 
different factors which have impact on leverage ratio. Besides growth, time, non-debt tax 
shields, size, foreign exchange risk and free cash flows, age and collateral value became 
significant at 5% and both with positive coefficient. Older firms will have more debt and 
firms which have more assets that can be collateralized have also more leverage.   
5. Conclusions 
MNCs operate in a very complex environment and they face different risks and factors 
from firms which only operates in their own country. When managers are faced with 
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decisions regarding the capital structure of the MNCs all these factors and risks should 
be taken into consideration. This paper intended to prove that there is a difference in the 
capital structure of DCs and MNCs in Europe. In order to do so, five important countries 
that belong to the European Union were selected. When the sample is divided into these 
two groups, it is possible to investigate which factors are relevant to determine the debt 
for MNCs but also for DCs. For MNCs there are several variables that can influence long 
term debt. These factors are profitability, foreign exchange risk, size, business risk, 
collateral value, non-debt tax shields, growth, and time. However, these factors may 
change if the sample is divided into two periods: one period before the financial crisis - 
before 2008 - and another after. For MNCs profitability of the firm is the sole factor that 
started to have significance in influencing the leverage ratio after the world financial 
crisis. However, free cash flows, after the crisis, are no longer significant even if before 
they were at 10%. For DCs, for the all period there are fewer factors that can explain the 
capital structure of these firms: growth, size and collateral value. Just as it was done for 
MNCs, DCs firms were divided into two sub-periods, one before 2008 and another after 
2008. Some factors started to make sense in the influence of leverage ratios after the 
financial crisis: business risk, and time trend. In conclusion, MNCs and DCs have 
different influencing factors in their capital structure and after the crisis the relevant 
factors to understand leverage have changed.  
MNCs and DCs display a different average for leverage, and there is effectively a 
difference between leverage ratios. European MNCs have less debt than DCs. The major 
factors, which can explain the difference are non-debt tax shields, profitability, age, 
foreign exchange risk, size, and collateral value of assets. MNCs display a higher impact 
on leverage of non-debt tax shield, profitability, foreign exchange risk and collateral value 
of assets than DCs. However, the age of the firm and the size have less impact on MNCs 
than DCs. However, this difference between MNCs and DCs disappears if industry 
dummies are considered.  
Taking into consideration the MNCs group, this group was divided into firms that have 
greater exposure to European markets and firms that have a greater exposure to other 
countries outside Europe.  There is also a difference in capital structure between these 
two groups: European MNCs that focus on the European market have more debt than 
those which have a bigger exposure to countries that do not belong to Europe. The 
difference is persistent even when industries effects were taken into consideration. The 
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main factors that can explain the difference found in this situation are free cash flows and 
profitability.  
 
For further investigation, it would be interesting to incorporate all the European Union 
members in the study. Also, it would be interesting to have more information regarding 
other companies that are not listed in any stock exchange and for this particular case, 




6. APPPENDICES  
6.1. ‘All Sample’ 
6.1.1. Model 1  
Table 7- Model 1 for All firms in Portugal, Spain, Germany, France and U.K. This tables shows the results from Model 1 for two periods: 2001-2007 and 2008-2014. ***,**,* represents that 
the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level
 All European Firms 2001-2007 All European Firms 2008-2014 
  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.27 0.00*** -2.13 0.00*** 
CV 0.06 0.02** 0.12 0.00*** 
FCF -0.01 0.19 -0.00 0.50 
FR 0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.05* 
PR -0.00 0.63 -0.0 0.81 
Growth -0.00 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.00 0.88 -0.02 0.01*** 
NDTS 0.12 0.00*** 0.19 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
Age -0.01 0.13 -0.00 0.67 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -0.81 0.00*** -0.43 0.00*** 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  
     
R2Overall  28%  39% 
Wald Test 379.04 0.00*** 693.56 0.00*** 
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6.1.2. Model 2 and Model 3 
 Model 2 2001-2007 Model 2 2008-2014 Model 3 2001-2007 Model 3 2008-2014 
 Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.27 0.00*** -2.12 0.00*** -0.16 0.12 -2.71 0.00*** 
CV 0.06 0.03** 0.12 0.00*** -0.03 0.58 -0.01 0.93 
FCF -0.01 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.79 0.04 0.11 
FR 0.05 0.04** -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.77 -0.03 0.60 
PR 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.43 
Growth 0.00 0.00*** -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof 0.00 0.91 -0.02 -0.27 -0.10 0.01*** -0.04 0.01** 
NDTS 0.12 0.00*** 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.36 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.12 0.1 0.00*** 0.06 0.00*** 
Age -0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.91 -0.01 0.78 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -0.79 0.00*** -0.42 -0.79 -1.72 0.00*** -0.90 0.00*** 
MNC -0.04 0.09* -0.06 0.02** 0.92 0.00*** 0.45 0.15 
BRMNC     -0.13 0.26 0.82 0.04** 
CVMNC     0.12 0.09* 0.15 0.05** 
FCFMNC     -0.02 0.37 -0.04 0.08* 
FRMNC     0.03 0.68 0.04 0.51 
PRMNC     0.00 0.97 0.00 0.41 
GrowthMNC     0.00 0.75 -0.01 0.00*** 
ProfMNC     0.11 0.01*** 0.03 0.11 
NDTSMNC     0.12 0.07* 0.13 0.27 
SizeMNC     -0.05 0.00*** -0.03 0.01** 
AgeMNC     -0.01 0.43 0.00 0.87 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
R2Overall  28%  39%  29%  40% 
Wald Test 382.06 0.00*** 699.62 0.00*** 425.10 0.00*** 758.98 0.00*** 
Table 8- This table shows the results from Model 2 and 3 for two different periods: 2001 to 2007 and 2008 to 2014. ***,**,*, represents that 












6.2. MNCs sub-sample and DCs sub-sample 















Table 9 - This table shows the results from Model 1 for MNCs and DCs and also for two different periods: 2001 to 2007 and 2008 to 2014. ***,**,*, represents that 
coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
 DCs 2001-2007 DCs 2008-2014 MNCs 2001-2007 MNCs 2008-2014 
  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR 0.01 0.95 -2.66 0.00*** -0.34 0.00*** -1.92 0.00*** 
CV -0.05 0.50 0.00 0.95 0.07 0.02** 0.14 0.00*** 
FCF 0.00 0.96 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.09* 0.00 0.32 
FR 0.04 0.60 -0.01 0.82 0.06 0.01** 0.00 0.86 
PR 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.83 
Growth -0.01 0.01*** -0.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
Prof -0.11 0.01*** -0.04 0.04* 0.00 0.78 -0.01 0.07* 
NDTS 0.06 0.20 0.09 0.39 0.20 0.00*** 0.22 0.00*** 
Size 0.09 0.00*** 0.07 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 0.03 0.00*** 
Age -0.02 0.29 -0.01 0.66 -0.01 0.25 0.00 0.68 
Time 0.00 0.99 -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -1.43 0.00*** -1.00 0.00*** -0.81 0.00*** -0.44 0.00*** 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
R2Overall  35%  42%  29%  40% 
Wald Test 77.10 0.00*** 139.41 0.00*** 374.83 0.00*** 622.35 0.00*** 
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6.2.2. Model 4 and Model 5 
Table 10 - This table shows the results from Model 4 and 5 for two different periods: 2001 to 2007 and 2008 to 2014. ***,**,*, represents that 








 Model 4 2001-2007 Model 4 2008-2014 Model 5 2001-2007 Model 5 2008-2014 
 Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.34 0.00*** -1.91 0.00*** -0.29 0.00*** -1.85 0.00*** 
CV 0.07 0.03** 0.14 0.00*** 0.08 0.01** 0.15 0.00*** 
FCF -0.01 0.10* 0.00 0.34 -0.45 0.00*** -0.42 0.00*** 
FR 0.07 0.01*** 0.01 0.65 0.08 0.00*** 0.01 0.66 
PR 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.71 
Growth 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
Prof 0.00 0.93 -0.01 0.07* 0.00 0.40 -0.01 0.10 
NDTS 0.20 0.00*** 0.22 0.00*** 0.21 0.00*** 0.22 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 0.03 0.00*** 
Age -0.01 0.25 0.00 0.73 -0.01 0.38 0.00 0.98 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -0.80 0.00*** -0.42 0.00*** -0.77 0.00*** -0.36 0.00*** 
Global -0.04 0.05** -0.03 0.06* -0.09 0.00*** -0.07 0.00*** 
BRGlobal     0.00 0.32 0.00 0.03** 
CVGlobal     0.27 0.01** -0.02 0.45 
FCFGlobal     0.48 0.00*** 0.28 0.03** 
FRGlobal     7.39 0.02** 1.14 0.50 
PRGlobal     -0.01 0.05* 0.00 0.46 
GrowthGlobal     -0.02 0.16 0.04 0.00*** 
ProfGlobal     -4.88 0.00*** -3.35 0.32 
NDTSGlobal     -0.36 0.00*** 0.02 0.55 
SizeGlobal     0.08 0.75 -0.08 0.27 
AgeGlobal     2.65 0.01*** 0.66 0.53 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
R2Overall  30%  40%  32%  41% 
Wald Test 379.46 0.00*** 626.20 0.00*** 423.39 0.00*** 655.29 0.00 
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6.3. EU sub-sample and Global sub-sample 













Table 21 - This table shows the results from Model 1 for MNCs with European Exposure and MNCs with Global exposure and also for two different periods: 2001 to 2007 











  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.19 0.20 -1.65 0.00*** -0.30 0.00*** -1.80 0.00*** 
CV 0.16 0.01*** 0.00 0.95 0.04 0.21 0.19 0.00*** 
FCF -0.49 0.00*** -0.30 0.02** -0.01 0.35 0.00 0.29 
FR 0.17 0.00*** 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.54 
PR 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.85 
Growth 0.00 0.03** -0.04 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof 0.01 0.03** 0.00 0.63 -0.10 0.00*** -0.17 0.00*** 
NDTS 0.06 0.30 0.13 0.15 0.54 0.00*** 0.21 0.01*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
Age 0.00 0.77 0.02 0.22 -0.01 0.43 0.00 0.85 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -0.81 0.00*** -0.26 0.21 -1.13 0.00*** -0.50 0.00*** 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
R2Overall  40%  45%  30%  41% 




6.4 . Industry 
6.4.1 Model 1 for ‘All Sample’, MNCs and DCs 
 
Table 32 - This table shows the results from Model 1, in this Model several dummy variables were introduced in order to control for industry effects. The table shows the results for ‘All 
sample’ of firms, for MNCs and for DCs. This table have data from 2001-2014. ***,**,*, represents that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 All European Firms 2001-2014 DCs 2001-2014 MNCs 2001-2014 
  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.19 0.00*** -0.11 0.40 -0.18 0.01*** 
CV 0.06 0.02** -0.16 0.01** 0.09 0.00*** 
FCF 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.51 -0.01 0.11 
FR 0.02 0.13 -0.10 0.03** 0.08 0.00*** 
PR 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.98 
Growth -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.00*** -0.02 0.19 -0.01 0.00*** 
NDTS 0.19 0.00*** 0.06 0.31 0.27 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.09 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
Age 0.00 0.72 -0.01 0.43 0.00 0.61 
Time 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.46 -0.01 0.00*** 
cons -0.94 0.00*** -1.78 0.00*** -0.93 0.00*** 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
R2Overall  40%  61% 43%  
Wald Test 713.74 0.00*** 224.23 0.00*** 679.77 0.00*** 
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6.4.2. ‘All Sample’ 
6.4.2.1. Model 1  
 
Table 43 - This table shows the results from Model 1, in this Model several dummy variables were introduced in order to control for industry effects. The table shows the results for ‘All 
sample’ of firms. The sample period was divided into two different periods: 2001-2007 and 2008-2014. ***,**,*, represents that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 All European Firms 2001-2007 All European Firms 2008-2014 
  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.26 0.00*** -2.01 0.00*** 
CV 0.07 0.03** 0.15 0.00*** 
FCF -0.01 0.16 0.00 0.35 
FR 0.05 0.03** -0.01 0.69 
PR 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.61 
Growth 0.00 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.16 -0.02 0.01*** 
NDTS 0.12 0.00*** 0.18 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.03 0.00*** 
Age -0.02 0.04** 0.00 0.60 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -0.88 0.00*** -0.35 0.07* 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  
     
R2Overall  39%  49% 
Wald Test 484.32 0.00*** 827.69 0.00*** 
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6.4.2.2. Model 2 
 
Table 54 - This table shows the results from Model 2, in this Model several dummy variables were introduced in 
order to control for industry effects. The table shows the results three different periods: 2001-2014, 2001-2007 and 












 Model 2 2001-2007 Model 2 2008-2014 Model 2 2001-2014 
 Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.26 0.00*** -2.01 0.00*** -0.19 0.00*** 
CV 0.07 0.03** 0.15 0.00*** 0.06 0.02** 
FCF -0.01 0.17 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.38 
FR 0.05 0.03** 0.00 0.90 0.03 0.06* 
PR 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.83 
Growth 0.00 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.16 -0.02 0.01*** -0.01 0.00*** 
NDTS 0.12 0.00*** 0.18 0.00*** 0.19 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.03 0.00*** 0.05 0.00*** 
Age -0.01 0.05** 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.70 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
cons -0.88 0.00*** -0.35 0.08* -0.93 0.00*** 
MNC -0.02 0.49 -0.03 0.22 -0.03 0.14 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
R2Overall  39%  49%  40% 
Wald Test 484.09 0.00*** 828.43 0.00*** 715.27 0.00*** 
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6.4.3. MNCs sub-sample and DCs sub-sample 
6.4.3.1. Model 1 
 DCs 2001-2007 DCs 2008-2014 MNCs 2001-2007 MNCs 2008-2014 
  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR 0.01 0.91 -2.34 0.00*** -0.33 0.00*** -1.75 0.00*** 
CV -0.09 0.17 -0.05 0.65 0.08 0.02** 0.18 0.00*** 
FCF -0.01 0.56 0.03 0.29 -0.02 0.05** -0.01 0.19 
FR -0.07 0.43 -0.05 0.40 0.07 0.00*** 0.03 0.21 
PR 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.57 
Growth -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
Prof -0.18 0.00*** -0.03 0.10* -0.01 0.41 -0.01 0.04** 
NDTS 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.42 0.19 0.00*** 0.20 0.00*** 
Size 0.08 0.00*** 0.09 0.00*** 0.05 0.00*** 0.03 0.00*** 
Age -0.02 0.21 0.00 0.88 -0.01 0.08* 0.00 0.80 
Time 0.00 0.96 -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -1.70 0.00*** -1.69 0.00*** -0.86 0.00*** -0.31 0.10 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
R2Overall  74%  63%  42%  52% 
Wald Test 281.26 0.00*** 175.37 0.00*** 464.74 0.00*** 762.63 0.00*** 
Table 65 - This table shows the results from Model 1, in this Model several dummy variables were introduced in order to control for industry effects. The table shows 
the results for MNCs and for DCs. This table shows the results for two different periods: 2001-2007 and 2008-2014 . ***,**,*, represents that coefficients are 




6.4.3.2. Model 4 and 5
 Model 4 2001-2007 Model 4 2008-2014 Model 5 2001-2007 Model 5 2008-2014 
 Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.33 0.00*** -1.75 0.00*** -0.28 0.00*** -1.71 0.00*** 
CV 0.08 0.02** 0.18 0.00*** 0.08 0.01** 0.18 0.00*** 
FCF -0.01 0.06* -0.01 0.20 -0.40 0.00*** -0.35 0.00*** 
FR 0.08 0.00*** 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.00*** 0.04 0.15 
PR 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.46 
Growth 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.28 -0.01 0.04** 0.00 0.70 -0.01 0.06* 
NDTS 0.19 0.00*** 0.20 0.00*** 0.20 0.00*** 0.20 0.00*** 
Size 0.05 0.00*** 0.03 0.00*** 0.05 0.00*** 0.03 0.00*** 
Age -0.01 0.10* 0.00 0.90 -0.01 0.17 0.00 0.75 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
_cons -0.84 0.00*** -0.29 0.13 -0.84 0.00*** -0.27 0.17 
Global -0.05 0.04** -0.04 0.04** -0.09 0.00*** -0.07 0.00*** 
BRGlobal     0.00 0.38 0.00 0.05* 
CVGlobal     0.29 0.01*** -0.02 0.44 
FCFGlobal     0.43 0.00*** 0.23 0.09* 
FRGlobal     7.30 0.02** 1.08 0.52 
PRGlobal     -0.01 0.04** 0.00 0.46 
GrowthGlobal     -0.02 0.13 0.04 0.01*** 
ProfGlobal     -4.53 0.00*** -3.30 0.33 
NDTSGlobal     -0.38 0.00*** 0.02 0.53 
SizeGlobal     0.13 0.58 -0.08 0.26 
AgeGlobal     2.53 0.01*** 0.70 0.50 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
R2Overall  43%  52%  45%  53% 
Wald Test 479.64 0.00*** 770.52 0.00*** 511.74 0.00*** 785.34 0.00 
Table 76- This table shows the results from Model 4 and Model 5, in these Models several dummy variables were introduced in order to control for 
industry effects. The table shows the results for two different periods: 2001- 2007 and 2008- 2014. ***,**,*, represents that coefficients are significant 




  Table 87- This table shows the results from Model 4 and 5, in these Models several dummy variables were introduced 
in order to control for industry effects. The table shows the results for 2001-2014. ***,**,*, represents that coefficients 
are significant at 1%, 5% and 10.
 Model 4 2001-2014 Model 5 2001-2014 
 Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
BR -0.18 0.01*** -0.17 0.01** 
CV 0.09 0.00*** 0.09 0.00*** 
FCF -0.01 0.13 -0.38 0.00*** 
FR 0.09 0.00*** 0.09 0.00*** 
PR 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.94 
Growth -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.01*** 
NDTS 0.27 0.00*** 0.28 0.00*** 
Size 0.04 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
Age 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.98 
Time -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
cons -0.90 0.00*** -0.86 0.00*** 
Global -0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.00*** 
BRGlobal   0.00 0.88 
CVGlobal   0.00 0.76 
FCFGlobal   0.40 0.00*** 
FRGlobal   1.74 0.24 
PRGlobal   0.00 0.64 
GrowthGlobal   -0.01 0.29 
ProfGlobal   -1.67 0.07* 
NDTSGlobal   0.00 0.85 
SizeGlobal   -0.08 0.11 
AgeGlobal   0.53 0.12 








     
R2Overall  43%  44% 



















  Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value 
BR -0.17 0.25 -1.34 0.00*** -0.30 0.00*** -1.67 0.00*** 
CV 0.20 0.00*** 0.09 0.31 0.03 0.46 0.21 0.00*** 
FCF -0.43 0.00*** -0.27 0.05** -0.01 0.28 -0.01 0.23 
FR 0.17 0.00*** 0.13 0.03** 0.07 0.02** 0.01 0.69 
PR 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.93 
Growth 0.00 0.05** -0.04 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
Prof 0.01 0.23 0.00 0.92 -0.13 0.00*** -0.17 0.00*** 
NDTS 0.05 0.34 0.11 0.21 0.52 0.00*** 0.20 0.01** 
Size 0.06 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
Age 0.02 0.31 0.04 0.01** -0.01 0.16 0.00 0.67 
Time -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
cons -0.85 0.00*** -0.15 0.64 -1.17 0.00*** -0.47 0.03** 
Country Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
R2Overall  69%  64%  43%  53% 
Wald Test 249.23 0.00*** 321.16 0.00*** 410.41 0.00*** 560.53 0.00*** 
Table 98 - This table shows the results from Model 1, in this Model several dummy variables were introduced in order to control for industry effects. The table shows 
the results for MNCs with European exposure and MNCs with Global Exposure. The results are divided in two different periods: 2001-2007 and 2008-2014. ***,**,*, 




















Table 19 - This table shows the results from Model 1, in this Model several dummy variables were introduced in order to control 
for industry effects. The table shows the results for MNCs with European Exposure and MNCs with Global exposure. This table 
have data from 2001-2014. ***,**,*, represents that coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
 European Exposure 2001-2014 Global Exposure 2001-2014 
 Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
FCF -0.01 0.93 -0.18 0.01** 
Growth 0.10 0.05** 0.07 0.02** 
Prof -0.43 0.00*** 0.00 0.48 
Age 0.14 0.00*** 0.08 0.00*** 
FR 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.86 
Size 0.00 0.00*** -0.02 0.00*** 
PR -0.01 0.16 -0.11 0.00*** 
BR 0.12 0.03** 0.38 0.00*** 
CV 0.05 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
NDTS 0.03 0.01** -0.01 0.46 
Time -0.01 0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
cons -0.70 0.01** -0.99 0.00*** 
Country Dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
   
Industry Dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
   
     
R2 Overall  57%  45% 
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